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Available online 28 December 2009This article reviews the substantial impact computational neuroscience has had on neuroimaging over the
past years. It builds on the distinction between models of the brain as a computational machine and
computational models of neuronal dynamics per se; i.e., models of brain function and biophysics. Both sorts
of model borrow heavily from computational neuroscience, and both have enriched the analysis of
neuroimaging data and the type of questions we address. To illustrate the role of functional models in
imaging neuroscience, we focus on optimal control and decision (game) theory; the models used here
provide a mechanistic account of neuronal computations and the latent (mental) states represent by the
brain. In terms of biophysical modelling, we focus on dynamic causal modelling, with a special emphasis on
recent advances in neural-mass models for hemodynamic and electrophysiological time series. Each example
emphasises the role of generative models, which embed our hypotheses or questions, and the importance of
model comparison (i.e., hypothesis testing). We will refer to this theme, when trying to contextualise recent
trends in relation to each other.for Neuroimaging, Institute of
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The distinction between imaging and computational neuroscience
has become increasingly blurred over the past decade. The statistical
and computational expertise required to design and analyse neuroi-
maging experiments means that most practitioners in functionalmagnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electrophysiology (i.e.,
electroencephalography, EEG and magnetoencephalography, MEG)
could call themselves computational neuroscientists, at least in a
pragmatic sense. Computational neuroscience subsumes several
disciplines and techniques; we highlight two domains that have
particular relevance for neuroimaging; namely, models of brain
function (that try to account for perception, action and cognition)
and biophysical models of neuronal dynamics. Both have had an
enormous inﬂuence on imaging neuroscience and have enabled us to
ask fairly deep questions of our data. Over the past decade, one could
argue that the constructs of cognitive science have been replaced
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machine learning and optimal decision or game theory. Not only do
these schemes provide a mechanistic formulation but, in many cases,
allow one to make quantitative predictions that can be operationa-
lised in terms of explanatory variables (e.g., regressors in an fMRI
design matrix). The implicit recession of traditional cognitive theories
is evidenced on many fronts: for example, a preoccupation with
autonomous brain dynamics asmeasuredwith resting state fMRI (e.g.,
Raichle et al., 2001; Morcom and Fletcher, 2007; Achard et al., 2006;
Honey et al., 2007; Greicius et al., 2009; Deco et al., 2009) or
electrophysiology (e.g., Del Cul et al., 2007; Hesselmann et al., 2008;
Tognoli and Kelso 2009); a growing preponderance of studies in
neuroeconomics and game theory (e.g., O'Doherty et al., 2003;
Rodriguez et al., 2006; Delgado et al., 2008; Rangel et al., 2008;
Krajbich et al., 2009). Other examples and appeal to optimal control
(e.g., Grafton et al., 2008; Behrens et al., 2007) and information theory
(e.g., Strange et al., 2005) to ask how the brain makes optimal
decisions under uncertainty. Within perception, there is growing
interest in the role of top-down and bottom-up effects (e.g., Murray
et al., 2002; Garrido et al., 2007a,b), which are understood
increasingly in terms of message-passing and Bayesian inference
(e.g., Gregory, 1980; Ballard et al., 1983; Mumford, 1992; Dayan et al.,
1995; Ma et al., 2008). At their heart, all these approaches rest on
ideas that transcend conventional psychology.
A similar theme is echoed in the modelling of neuronal dynamics,
where there is a growing move away from simple descriptive models
and towards biophysically informed forwardmodels of data. Pertinent
examples include advances in electrophysiological source modelling
(e.g., Lopes da Silva et al., 1974; Jansen and Rit, 1995; Robinson et al.,
1997; Jirsa and Kelso, 2000; Nummenmaa et al., 2007; Mattout et al.,
2006; Clearwater et al., 2008; Wipf and Nagarajan, 2009; Alstott et al.,
2009). These advances allow the informed interrogation of evoked
and induced responses at their sources (cerebral cortex), as opposed
to sensors (channel space). In terms of biophysics, a progressive
reﬁnement of observation models has taken us from simple linear
convolution models for fMRI to state-space models with hidden
neuronal and hemodynamic states that can explain multiple modal-
ities (e.g., Daunizeau et al., 2007; Valdes-Sosa et al., 2009). These are
examples of dynamic causal models, which are just models of
dynamical processes that cause data. The key to dynamic causal
modelling (DCM) is model comparison: In brief, one compares the
evidence for different models of the same data, where each model
embodies a mechanistic hypothesis about how the data were
generated (hence generative models). Originally, DCM was intro-
duced for fMRI; however, the basic idea is now applied to different
modalities, with an increasing level of biophysical complexity (e.g.,
David et al., 2004, 2006). This is important because it means that DCM
can now call on computational neuroscience to furnish models of
neuronal activity, in terms of ensemble dynamics and neural-mass
models (e.g., van Albada et al., 2009; Deco et al., 2009; see Deco et al.,
2008, for review). This represents a practical and useful coupling of
empirical neuroimaging with computational theory, which we will
pursue later.
Model comparison and implicit hypothesis testing is seen even in
apparently descriptive studies. For example, some of themost exciting
insights to emerge from the study of resting state networks in fMRI
(Achard et al., 2006; Bassett et al., 2006; Honey et al. 2009; Greicius
et al., 2009) rest on their formal similarities to simulated dynamics on
small-world or scale-free connectivity structures (Honey et al., 2007;
Deco et al., 2009). The point here is that the emergent behaviour of
generative models with dynamics on structure (Kriener et al., 2008;
Müller-Linow et al., 2008; Rubinov et al., 2009) enables the behaviour
of different models to be compared against observed behaviour. In
other words, the spectral properties and spatial deployment of self-
organised dynamics in the brain place constraints on the anatomical
and functional architectures that could support them. This macro-scopic organisation is related to self-organised pattern formation in
neural ﬁelds (Jirsa and Haken, 1996; Coombes and Doole, 1996;
Freeman, 2005; Buice and Cowan, 2009) of the sort described by
Coombes (2010). In short, biophysical models play an important role
as generative models; both in the context of studying emergent
behaviours and as dynamic causal models for data. In what follows,
we will try to highlight the implicit role of generative models in the
applications considered.
This review comprises two sections. In the ﬁrst, we consider
generative models of brain function that are cast in purely
functionalist terms. We start with a brief overview of recent trends
in modelling designed fMRI experiments and illustrate the basic
approach using a recent example from our own laboratory. This
example addresses theory of mind in cooperative games and shows
how computational techniques can contribute to issues in social
neuroscience (see also King-Casas et al., 2008). In the second section,
we turn to biophysical modelling of distributed neuronal responses,
where the key questions concern the underlying functional architec-
tures generating brain signals. We will focus on dynamic causal
modelling and overview recent advances in modelling electrophys-
iological data. We conclude with a brief survey of future develop-
ments and reiterate the importance of computational neuroscience
and dynamical systems theory in neuroimaging.
Computational fMRI
In this section, we sketch the use of computational models of brain
function in the modelling of fMRI data and provide an example that
illustrates a number of key points. In the past ﬁve or so years, a new
sort of data modelling philosophy has emerged: Instead of simply
modelling observed brain signals in terms of experimental factors
(e.g., as in conventional ANOVA models), researchers have begun to
explain their data in terms of quantities the brain must encode, under
simplifying assumptions about how the brain works (O'Doherty et al.,
2003; Haruno and Kawato, 2006; O'Doherty et al., 2007; Rangel et al.,
2008). These assumptions usually rest on the notion that the brain is
trying to optimise something. In perception, this can be cast in terms
of maximising the mutual information between sensory inputs and
internal representations of their causes (Barlow, 1961; Linsker, 1990;
Atick and Redlich, 1992; Olshausen and Field, 1996) or, equivalently,
the minimization of prediction error (Mumford, 1992; Rao and
Ballard, 1998; Murray et al., 2002). In terms of motor control, many
cost functions have been proposed, which the brain tries to minimize
during action (Todorov and Jordan, 1998; Kording andWolpert, 2004;
Shadmehr and Krakauer, 2008). Again, these can usually be reduced to
some form of prediction error (e.g., Tseng et al., 2007; Grafton et al.,
2008). Optimal decision theory (i.e., game theory) and reinforcement
learning assume that choices and behaviour are trying to maximize
expected utility or reward, where this optimisation rests upon
learning the value or quality of sensory contingencies and action
(Bellman, 1952; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Watkins and Dayan,
1992; Camerer, 2003; Todorov, 2006). Interestingly, this learning may
rest onminimization of a (reward) prediction error (Sutton and Barto,
1981; Montague et al., 1995; Schultz, 1998; Daw and Doya, 2006). In
short, most computational formulations of brain function can be cast
as an optimization of some function of sensory input, with respect to
internal brain states and the actions it emits. Indeed, our own
theoretical work suggests that all these quantities are the same thing,
namely free energy (Friston, Kilner and Harrison, 2006), which, under
some simplifying assumptions, is prediction error.
The central theme of optimisation appears in several guises. In
perception, it appears as the principle of maximum efﬁciency or
minimum redundancy (Barlow, 1961), the infomax principle (Linsker,
1990; Atick and Redlich, 1992; Olshausen and Field, 1996), predictive
coding (Rao and Ballard, 1998), the Bayesian brain hypothesis and so
on (see Friston, 2010, for a formal account of how these principles can
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assumption manifests as Bayes optimality and bounded rationality
(where bounds place constraints on optimisation). This rests on an
assumption that subjects extremise an expected utility or cost
function, which links perceptual (Bayesian) inference on hidden
states of the world to behaviour and choice. The (bounded) optimality
assumption is extremely useful, because it provides a principled way
to specify the mapping between sensory inputs and observed
behaviour. Furthermore, it suggests candidate (latent) variables that
may mediate this mapping and be represented by brain states. This
means one can work out what an ideal Bayesian observer or rational
person would do in response to cues, under a particular model of cue
generation and cue outcome associations. The model can then be
optimised in relation to observed behaviour and its latent variables
used as explanatory variables to identify their (regionally speciﬁc)
neurophysiological correlates.
Practically, this sort of analysis calls for a paradigm that invokes
inference (or learning) and decisions (or responses). The latent
variables (e.g., surprise, prediction error, value, uncertainly, etc.)
entailed by the paradigm are then evaluated under optimality
assumptions (e.g., the subject is Bayes optimal). Sometimes, the
stimuli or paradigm may specify these variables directly (e.g., in
studies of novelty such as Strange et al., 2005). More often, the
subject's behaviour is used to resolve uncertainty about which
model or model parameters a particular subject is actually using. In
these cases, the optimal responses are matched (in a maximum
likelihood sense) to the subjects' choices by adjusting the
parameters of a Bayes optimal scheme. Once a match is attained,
the implicit latent variables subtending Bayes optimal responses are
used to explain observed brain responses. In other words, they are
convolved with a hemodynamic response function to form
regressors in conventional linear convolution models of fMRI
signals. Signiﬁcant areas in the ensuing statistical parametric map
(or a priori regions of interest) can then be associated with
processing or encoding these idealised computational quantities.
This approach provides a direct link between some optimisation
scheme the subjects might be using and their underlying functional
anatomy.
Perhaps the best example of this approach is the use of reward
prediction error to build regressors for fMRI. Reward prediction error
is a key latent variable in reinforcement learning and related models
of optimal control. These include classical psychological models
(Rescorla andWagner, 1972), temporal differencemodels (a standard
model-free scheme for value learning; Sutton and Barto, 1981) and Q-
learning (Watkins and Dayan, 1992). The reward prediction error
reports the difference in the expected reward (i.e., value) and
observed reward. When reward prediction error has been minimised,
value learning is complete and the value function (encoding predicted
reward) speciﬁes an optimal behavioural policy. There is now a large
literature on the neurophysiological correlates of reward prediction
error and the functional anatomy of value learning; with a particular
focus on the ventral striatum and related structures (e.g., O'Doherty et
al., 2003; O'Doherty, 2004; Daw et al., 2006; Haruno and Kawato,
2006; O'Doherty et al., 2007; Rangel et al., 2008, Wittmann et al.,
2008). As a result of these computational fMRI studies, ventral striatal
responses can now be treated as a proxy for unexpected rewards of
the sort predicted by temporal difference models. This is remarkable,
because until recently the only regionally speciﬁc correlates of reward
came from invasive unit electrode recordings (Schultz, 1998).
Examples of computational fMRI outside the domain of reward
include motor control, where optimality theories can be evaluated
against empirical fMRI data (Grafton et al., 2008), and the use of
constructs from information theory to quantify novelty and surprise,
to index how the brain encodes causal regularities (or volatility) in
our sensorium (e.g., Strange et al., 2005; Behrens et al., 2007). Finally,
formal economic models are also informing neuroimaging inneuroeconomics and social neurosciences in a compelling way (e.g.,
Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Delgado et al., 2008; Krajbich et al., 2009).
An important aspect of computational fMRI is that one can test
different computational models against each other using fMRI
responses themselves. This means it may be possible to go beyond
the neural correlates of presumed mental (computational) processes
and actually adjudicate among different computational schemes on
the basis of their neurophysiological implementation. Furthermore,
the precise mapping from computational variables to neuronal
representations can be established by optimising neurometric func-
tions, which map from computational variables to observed neuronal
responses. In what follows we provide a brief example, which
illustrates how latent variables or mental states can be accessed and
then how they can be used to explain neuronal activity.
Modeling theory of mind and belief inference
Consider how we represent the intentions of others in cooperative
games or social interactions (e.g., Gallagher et al., 2002; Frith and
Frith, 2003; Maynard Smith, 1982; Camerer et al., 2004; Hampton
et al., 2008). To establish the underlying functional anatomy, we need
to quantify the key variables that map from sensory cues to optimal
responses. These variables are entailed by formal models of optimal
decision theory based on value or expected utility. Yoshida et al.
(2008) described one such model, for two or more players in
cooperative games, which invokes a value function over the joint
state space of all players. However, this creates a difﬁcult problem for
the brain because the representation and optimisation of a joint
value–function induces an inﬁnite regression. This is because to
evaluate your state and mine, I need to know how you value my state,
which means I need to know how you value my evaluation and so on
ad inﬁnitum. This inﬁnite regress can be ﬁnessed by assuming an
upper bound on the recursion, which is referred to as the level of
sophistication. Given a bound, it is possible to optimise the value–
function of any joint state and therefore predict the behaviour or
choice that maximises value. This model was tested by engaging
subjects in a cooperative game; a stag hunt where they could hunt
alone for a (small reward) rabbit or cooperate to hunt a (high reward)
stag. Although they were not told, subjects actually played a
computer, whose level of sophistication changed from time to time.
The subject's choices were used to infer an upper bound on their level
of sophistication (using model selection under Bayes optimal
assumptions). The ensuing bound was used to infer the subject's
inference about the opponent's level of sophistication at each point
during the game (see Fig. 1). This inference was quantiﬁed in terms of
a probability distribution over different levels of sophistication and
summarised in terms of its mode (most probable) and entropy (or
uncertainty). These two latent variables were then convolved with a
hemodynamic response function and used as regressors in a
conventional SPM analysis. Fig. 2 summarises the results of this
analysis and shows a double dissociation between lateral and medial
prefrontal cortex that encoded the opponent's sophistication and
associated uncertainty, respectively.
This example highlights a number of paradigmatic aspects of
computational fMRI. First, it enforces a principledmodel of probabilistic
computations that underlie inference and choice. Second, it shows how
the unknown parameters of a model can be optimised in relation to
observedbehaviour to access latentvariables thatmediateperformance;
here, a probabilistic representation of the opponent's sophistication.
Thiswas the key variable that subjects had to infer toplay thegame in an
optimal fashion. Third it highlights a subtle, but fundamental, issue in
computational fMRI; we have to infer the subject's inference. This is a
special problem in neuroscience, where the systemwemake inferences
about (i.e., the brain) is itself making inferences. Finally, it shows how
one can test different functions of latent variables as candidates for
representation in the brain; here, the mode and entropy of
Fig. 1.How to access the brain's computational states. This ﬁgure illustrates the sort of analyses used to estimate latent computational variables states, which are then used to explain
fMRI responses. This example considers the inferential (mental) states of a subject during cooperative game-playing. Cooperative (and competitive) interactions rest on the ability to
make inferences about the intentions of others, this is referred to as Theory of Mind. However, this poses a fundamental problem for the brain, in that a representation of another's
intentions includes their model of our intentions, and their model of our model of theirs, and so on ad inﬁnitum (see panel a). Yoshida et al. (2008, 2010) addressed this problem
using a game theoretic task (with a ‘stag-hunt’ pay-off structure): during scanning, subjects playedwith an opponent (a computer) to competitively catch low-valued prey (‘rabbits’)
or cooperatively catch high-valued prey (‘stags’). The subject's beliefs about the opponent were estimated using a Theory of Mind model, which assumes an upper bound on the
subject's recursion of reciprocal beliefs or ‘sophistication’. Crucially, this bound resolves the inﬁnite regress above. Panel b (upper panel) shows how one subject updated their
posterior beliefs about the opponent's sophistication (k) at each trial (where each game is separated by a gap). These beliefs were derived under (bounded) Bayes optimality
assumptions on the basis of their behaviour. The middle panel shows the sophistication of the computer's actual strategy (blue) and the subject's sophistication (green). This should
be one level higher that the most likely level of the opponent's sophistication. The lower panel shows the subject's uncertainty about the opponent's sophistication, as measured by
the entropy of the posterior distribution over k in the upper panel. The estimate of sophistication (green) and uncertainty about that estimate (black) were then used as stimulus
functions to identify the neuronal correlates of their respective representations in the brain. The results of this analysis are shown in Fig. 2.
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highlight the utility of computational models as generative models of
both behaviour and underlying brain states. In one sense, one could
regard these models as facilitating a fusion of behavioural and
neurophysiological responses; because both are explained by the
same generative (computational) model. This should be contrasted
with the conventional approach of simply modelling behaviours orFig. 2. Computational fMRI based on game theory of mind. Statistical parametric maps show
bounded rationality assumptions) and the uncertainty about those beliefs (see Fig. 1). Th
particular, activity withinmedial prefrontal cortex correlatedwith uncertainty about an oppo
sophistication per se (b). The ﬁndings suggest functional specialization for inference on the
could not have been obtained without quantifying beliefs and uncertainly. Computational fM
in this sophisticated (sic) example, the model was optimised using observed behaviour. Sestimuli per se, without reference to the latent variables that are entailed
computationally and have to be represented by the brain.
We conclude this section with some current examples of
computational fMRI and how it is being used to test computational
hypotheses. So far, we have considered models based upon how
subjects make decisions that maximise reward. In some situations
subjects have to deal with uncertainty in relation to outcomes ofing the neuronal (fMRI) correlates of beliefs about an opponent's sophistication (under
ese regionally speciﬁc correlates are within a prefrontal Theory of Mind network. In
nent's sophistication (a); while dorsolateral activity correlated with the inferred level of
sophistication of others, a process attributed to Theory of Mind. Crucially, these results
RI appeals to computational or theoretical models to infer these latent variables; where,
e Yoshida et al. (2010) for further details.
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known option and exploring unknown options to maximise long-
term reward. This class of problem is known as the explore–exploit
dilemma. One suggestion is that the value of exploration involves an
uncertainty bonus and that this enhanced uncertainty valuation
involves dopamine (Kakade and Dayan, 2002). However, a compu-
tational fMRI study testing these ideas showed that there was no
evidence for an uncertainty bonus, at either the level of behaviour or
neuronally (Daw et al., 2006). A related idea is that exploration of the
environment is mediated by ascribing bonuses to novelty rather than
uncertainty (Kakade and Dayan, 2002). Wittmann et al. (2008) tested
these ideas using a multiarmed bandit task, which included familiar
and unfamiliar (novel) choice options. Using a Q-learning model, the
authors showed that there was an optimistic initialisation of the
value of novel relative to familiar choices. This optimistic initialisa-
tion was associated with an enhanced signal in the striatum for novel
choices. In this case there was both behavioural and neuronal
evidence that was consistent with the theoretical predictions. This is
a nice example of how computational fMRI can adjudicate among
competing computations models and lend them an empirical validity.
Although model (i.e., hypothesis) comparison is only just emerging
as a generic tool in imaging neuroscience, most of the statistical
machinery is already in place. For example, it is now possible to
produce maps of the evidence for one model, relative to another, at
each point in the brain (Rosa et al., 2010). These Bayesian model
selection (BMS) maps are a special case of posterior probability maps
(PPMs), where the probability pertains not to a parameter or
treatment effect under a particular model, but the model itself, in
relation to other models.
Our focus in this section has been on associating brain areas with
computational processes. However, this association itself can engen-
der important new questions about the mapping between computa-
tional and physiological processes. For example, reward prediction
error typically maps onto regions that are either the source
(D'Ardenne et al., 2008) or target (e.g., O'Doherty et al., 2003;
O'Doherty, 2004; Daw et al., 2006) of midbrain dopaminergic
neurons. This begs the question about how and where the unique
impact of dopaminergic input is expressed post-synaptically. Indeed,
the interpretation of neuroimaging signals, in relation to dopaminer-
gic discharges, has become a key focus recently (Düzel et al., 2009).
Summary
In summary, an increasing number of studies now use fMRI to
adjudicate among models of neuronal computations and their
functional architectures. These studies rest on replacing traditional
explanatory variables in statistical models of imaging data with
quantities generated by computational models that are actually doing
something. The most developed examples are models of reinforce-
ment and value learning (O'Doherty et al., 2003; Rodriguez et al.,
2006; Haruno and Kawato, 2006; O'Doherty et al., 2007). They involve
(i) formulating a computational model that represents a hypothesis
about how the brain optimises its responses, (ii) optimising themodel
in relation to overt behavioural data and (iii) using the model's latent
variables to predict regionally speciﬁc fMRI responses. These studies
make computational neuroscience accountable to empirical neuro-
physiology and have established computational neuroimaging as an
exciting new paradigm. In the next section, we leave computational or
functional models of what the brain might represent and turn to
biophysical models of representations per se.
Biophysical modelling of neuronal systems
In this section, we address computational approaches to modelling
neuronal dynamics. Biophysical models of neuronal dynamics are
usually used for one of two things: either to understand the emergentproperties of neuronal systems or as observationmodels for measured
neuronal responses. We discuss examples of both. In terms of
emergent behaviours, we will consider dynamics on structure (Kriener
et al., 2008; Rubinov et al., 2009; Buice and Cowan, 2009) and how
this has been applied to characterising autonomous or endogenous
ﬂuctuations in fMRI signals (e.g., Honey et al., 2007; Deco et al., 2009).
We then consider neuronal models that are used to explain responses
elicited in designed experiments.
Modelling autonomous dynamics
There has been a recent upsurge in studies of fMRI signal
correlations observed while the brain is at rest (Biswal et al., 1995).
These patterns seem to reﬂect anatomical connectivity (Greicius et al.,
2009) and can be characterized in terms of remarkably reproducible
principal components or modes (i.e., resting state networks). One of
thesemodes recapitulates the pattern of deactivations observed across
a range of activation studies (the default mode; Raichle et al., 2001).
These studies highlight that, even at rest, endogenous brain activity is
self-organizing and highly structured. In this context, there are many
mechanistic questions about the genesis of autonomous dynamics and
the structures that support them. Some of themost interestingwork in
this ﬁeld has come from computational anatomy and neuroscience.
The emerging picture is that endogenous ﬂuctuations are a conse-
quence of dynamics on anatomical connectivity structures with
particular scale-invariant and small-world characteristics (Achard
et al., 2006; Honey et al., 2007; Bassett et al., 2006; Deco et al., 2009).
These are well-studied and universal characteristics of complex
systems and suggest that we may be able to understand the brain in
terms of universal phenomena. For example, Buice and Cowan (2009)
model neocortical dynamics using ﬁeld theoretic methods for
nonequilibrium statistical processes to describe both neural ﬂuctua-
tions and responses to stimuli. They predict that at low spiking rates,
neocortical activity will exhibit a phase transition, which is in the
universality class of directed percolation. In their models, the density
and spatial extent of lateral cortical interactions induce a region of
state-space, in which the effects of ﬂuctuations are negligible.
However, as the generation and decay of neuronal activity becomes
more balanced, there is a crossover into a critical ﬂuctuation region.
This approach suggests that the scaling laws found in many
measurements of neocortical activity are consistentwith the existence
of phase transitions at a critical point. It shows how such properties
lead to both random and rhythmic brain activity (Buice and Cowan,
2009) and speaks to larger questions about how the brainmaintains its
dynamics near phase-transitions (i.e., self-organised criticality; Kitz-
bichler et al., 2009) and the putative role of cortical gain control
(Abbott et al., 1997). This is an important issue, because self-
organization near phase transitions shows universal patterns and
structures, as studied in synergetics (e.g., Jirsa et al., 1994; Tschacher
and Haken, 2007). Synergetics rests on the order-parameter concept,
which was generalised by Haken to the enslaving principle, i.e., the
dynamics of fast-relaxing (stable) modes are completely determined
by the slow dynamics of order-parameters (the amplitudes of a small
number of unstable modes). Understanding and characterising these
modesmay be an important step towards a universal dynamicalmodel
of how the brain organises itself to predict and act on its sensorium.
Although there have been recent papers arguing for criticality and
power law effects in large-scale cortical activity (e.g. Kitzbichler et al.,
2009; Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2001; Stam and de Bruin, 2004;
Freyer et al., 2009) there is also work that argues otherwise; at least at
higher frequencies (e.g. Bedard et al., 2006, Miller et al., 2007, Touboul
and Destexhe, 2009). The important distinction appears to be that
‘slow’ frequencies (b30 Hz) may contain critical oscillations, whereas
high frequency coherent oscillations (including gamma) may reﬂect
other dynamical processes. In short, endogenous ﬂuctuations may be
one way in which anatomy speaks to us through dynamics. They also
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responses (e.g., Hesselmann et al., 2008).
Computational approaches to understanding phenomena in
neuroimaging data focus on emergent dynamics and the constraints
under which brain-like behaviour manifest. In the remainder of this
section, we turn to computational models that try to explain observed
neuronal activity directly. This is a relatively new ﬁeld that rests on
recent advances in model ﬁtting or inversion. Model inversion is
important: to date, most efforts in computational neuroscience have
focused on generative models of neuronal dynamics (that deﬁne a
mapping from causes to neuronal dynamics). The inversion of these
models (the mapping from neuronal dynamics to their causes) now
allows one to test different models against empirical data. This is best
exempliﬁed by dynamic causal modelling.
Dynamic causal modelling
Dynamic causal modelling refers to Bayesian inversion and
comparison of dynamic models that cause observed data. These
models are usually formulated in continuous time and can be
regarded as state-space models. Usually, but not necessarily, these
formulations are in terms of ordinary differential equations that
govern the motion of hidden neurophysiological states, while an
observer function maps from hidden states to observed brain signals.
This mapping is probabilistic and involves some observation noise.
Noise at the level of the hidden states would call upon stochastic
differential equations (i.e., stochastic DCMs; Friston et al., 2008) but
these have been used less, so far.
Differential equations are essential when modelling the dynamics
of biological processes and accommodate computational neurosci-
encemodels gracefully. The basic idea behind DCM is to formulate one
or more models of how data are caused in terms of a network of
distributed sources. These sources talk to each other through
parameterised connections and inﬂuence the dynamics of hidden
states that are intrinsic to each source. Model inversion provides
conditional densities on their parameters; namely extrinsic connec-
tion strengths and intrinsic (synaptic) parameters. These conditional
densities can be used to integrate out dependencies on the parameters
to provide the probability of the data given the model per se (see
Friston et al., 2007, for a technical review) This is known as themodel
evidence and is used for model comparison.
DCM was originally introduced for fMRI using a simple state-space
model based upon a bilinear approximation to the underlying equations
of motion that couple neuronal states in different brain regions (Friston
et al., 2003). This approximation is parameterised in terms of coupling
parameters that correspond to effective connectivity: it was these
unknown parameters that were the primary focus. Crucially, DCMs are
generalisations of the conventional convolution model used to analyse
fMRI data and event-related potential (ERP) analyses in electrophysi-
ological research. The only difference is that one allows for hidden
neuronal states in one part of the brain to be inﬂuenced by neuronal
states elsewhere. In this sense, they are biophysically informed
multivariate analyses of distributed brain responses.
Most DCMs consider point sources both for fMRI and EEG data (cf.
equivalent current dipoles) and are formally equivalent to graphical
models, which are used as generative or causal models of observed
responses. Inference on the couplingwithin and between nodes (brain
regions) is based on perturbing the system with known experimental
inputs and trying to explain the observed responses by optimising the
model. This optimisation furnishes posterior or conditional probability
distributions on the unknown parameters and the evidence for the
model; this is tremendously important because it enables model
comparison (Penny et al., 2004). Recently, the power of Bayesian
model comparison, in the context of dynamic causal modelling, has
become increasing evident. This now represents one of the most
important applications of DCM and allows different hypotheses to betested, where each DCM corresponds to a speciﬁc hypothesis about
functional brain architectures (e.g., Acs and Greenlee, 2008; Allen et
al., 2008;Grol et al., 2007;Heimet al., 2009; Smith et al., 2006; Stephan
et al., 2007; Summerﬁeld and Koechlin, 2008).
Although DCM is probably best known through its application to
fMRI, most recent advances have focused on neurobiologically
plausible models of electrophysiological dynamics, which grounds
them in computational neuroscience. Furthermore, different data
features (e.g., ERPs or induced responses) can be modelled with the
same DCM and it has even been applied to steady state recordings,
under local stationarity assumptions. Figs. 3–7 illustrate some key
developments in DCM, which we now review brieﬂy.DCM and neural-mass models
The biological plausibility of DCMs for fMRI has been increased by
modelling excitatory and inhibitory sub-populations within each
source of fMRI signal (Marreiros et al., 2008). This enables one to
model excitatory and inhibitory connections, through positivity
constraints (i.e., enforcing a connection to be positive or negative).
The beauty of these models is that one can use them to test
hypotheses about selective changes in intrinsic and extrinsic
connectivity that meditate fMRI responses. See Fig. 3 for an example,
which uses model comparison to identify the locus of attentional
modulation. The second development has been to reﬁne the mapping
between neuronal activity and hemodynamic signals (using model
comparison) to adjudicate among models that have emerged in the
physiological and MRI physics literature (Obata et al., 2004; Stephan
et al., 2007). Finally, the original bilinear form of DCM has been
extended to a nonlinear formulation, with addition of a term that
incorporates the modulation of coupling between two regions by a
third (Stephan et al., 2008). This can be important, when considering
things like the origin of top-down effects (e.g., attention).
More recent efforts have focused on DCMs for electromagnetic
(EEG and MEG) data (David et al., 2006; Kiebel et al., 2006, 2007;
Garrido et al., 2007a,b, 2008; Chen et al., 2008), with related
developments to cover local ﬁeld potential (LFP) recordings (Moran
et al., 2007, 2008). These models are more sophisticated than the
neuronal models for fMRI and are based upon neural-mass or mean-
ﬁeld models of interacting neuronal populations. Typically each
source of electromagnetic activity is modelled as an equivalent
current dipole (or ensemble of small cortical patches); whose activity
reﬂects the depolarisation of three populations (usually one inhibi-
tory and two excitatory). Crucially, one can embed any neural-mass
model into DCM. These can include models based upon second-order
linear differential equations (cf. Lopes da Silva et al., 1974; Jansen and
Rit, 1995) or conductance-based models based on nonlinear differ-
ential equations (cf. Morris and Lecar, 1981).
The variant used most commonly is based on the form suggested
by Jansen and Rit (1995). These models comprise (i) simple linear
second-order differential equations describing depolarisation and (ii)
a static nonlinearity mapping from depolarisation to spiking. Spiking
couples the activity of one population to another. As with DCM for
fMRI, DCMs for EEG and MEG are just generalisations of conventional
(equivalent current dipole) models that have been ﬁnessed by
parameterised connections among and within sources (David et al.,
2006). These models fall into the class of spatiotemporal dipole
models (Scherg and Von Cramon, 1985) and enable the entire time
series over peristimulus time to constrain the estimates of their
parameters and evidence. Face validation of these models has used
known electrophysiological phenomena and established metrics of
coupling (e.g., David and Friston, 2003; David et al., 2004). Their
predictive validity has been established in a series of experiments
using the mismatch negativity (Näätänen, 2003) as an exemplar
sensory learning paradigm (e.g., Garrido et al., 2007a, 2008).
Fig. 3. Dynamical causalmodelling for fMRI. Dynamical causalmodelling (DCM) tries to infer directed connectivity among brain regions or sources. Thesemodels distinguish between
a neuronal level, which models neuronal interactions among regions and an observation level, which, for fMRI, models the ensuing hemodynamic responses. Here, we look at the
attentional modulation of evoked responses (in the context of visual motion processing) and see that it is best explained by an increased sensitivity of excitatory populations of
neurons in V5 to forward afferents from earlier visual areas. Left: This example uses a DCM with two neuronal states (populations) per region. which affords an explicit model of
intrinsic (between-population) connectivity within a region. In addition, by using positivity constraints (through the exponential in the neuronal state equation), the model
reﬂects the organisation of real cortical hierarchies, whose extrinsic connections are excitatory (glutamatergic). Excitatory and inhibitory neuronal states for the ith region are
denoted by x(i)t{xE(i), xI(i)} and exogenous (experimental) inputs (such as photic stimulation,motion or attention) are encoded by ut{u1, u2,…}. By comparing these sorts of DCM, one
can disambiguate among competing hypotheses about the locus of context-sensitive changes in coupling, I uð Þ. Middle: In all threemodels considered here, photic stimulation enters
V1 and motion modulates the connection from V1 to V5, and all assume reciprocal and hierarchical extrinsic (between region) connections. The models differ in how attention
modulates the inﬂuences on the excitatory population in V5 (green ellipses): model 1 assumes modulation of backward extrinsic connections, model 2 assumes modulation of
intrinsic connections andmodel 3 assumesmodulation of forward connections. Right: The results of Bayesianmodel comparison (upper graph) are shown in terms of the log evidence
for eachmodel:Model 3 (modulation of the forward connections by attention) is selected over other twomodels. The lower graph shows the predicted an observed regional responses
under this model. See Marreiros et al. (2008) for details.
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along two lines. First, researchers have exploredmore realistic neural-
mass models based upon nonlinear differential equations whose
states correspond to voltages and conductances (cf. Morris and Lecar,
1981; see Fig. 4). This allows one to formulate DCMs in terms of well-
characterised (if simple) synaptic dynamics andmodel different types
of receptor-mediated currents explicitly. Furthermore, conventional
neural-mass modelling (which considers only the average state of a
neuronal ensemble) has been extended to cover ensemble dynamics
in terms of population densities. This involves modelling not just the
average but also the dispersion and covariance among the states of
different populations (Harrison et al., 2005; Marreiros et al., 2009).
See Fig. 5 for an example of the effect that modelling the dispersion of
neuronal states can have on population responses.
The second lineof developmentpertains to theparticular data features
themodels try to explain. In conventional DCMs for ERPs, the time course
of voltage at the sensors is modelled explicitly. However, DCMs for
spectral responses (Moran et al., 2007;Moran et al., 2008) can be applied
tocontinuous recordingsof arbitrary length. Thismodelling initiative rests
ona linear systemsanalysis of theunderlyingneural-massmodel to give a
predicted spectral response for unknown but parameterised endogenous
input. This means that, given the spectral proﬁle of electrophysiologicalrecordings, one can estimate the coupling among different sources and
the spectral energy of neuronal and observation noise generating
observed spectra. This has proved particularly useful for LFP recordings
and has been validated using animal models and psychopharmacological
constructs (Moran et al., 2007, 2008). Indeed, this could be a potentially
important tool in studies of receptor function and related learning
paradigms in animals and man. Finally, there are DCMs for induced
responses (Chen et al., 2008). Like the steady state models, these predict
the spectral density of responses but in a time-dependent fashion. The
underlying neural model here is based upon the simple bilinear
approximation to any neuronal dynamics. The key beneﬁt of these
DCMs is that one can quantify the evidence for between-frequency
coupling among sources, relative to homologous models restricted to
within-frequency coupling. Coupling between frequencies corresponds to
nonlinear coupling. Being able to detect nonlinear coupling is important
because it speaks to the synaptic mechanisms that might differentiate
between forward and backward connections in the brain.
Forward and backward connections in the brain
To provide a concrete example of how DCM has been used to build
a picture of dynamic computation in the brain, we focus on the role of
Fig. 4.Dynamical causal modelling for EEG. Neuronally plausible, generative or forwardmodels are essential for understanding how event-related ﬁelds (ERFs) and potentials (ERPs)
are generated. DCMs for event-related responses measured with EEG or MEG use biologically informed models to make inferences about the underlying neuronal networks
generating responses. The approach can be regarded as a neurobiologically constrained source reconstruction scheme, in which the parameters of the reconstruction have an explicit
neuronal interpretation. Speciﬁcally, these parameters encode, among other things, the coupling among sources and how that coupling depends upon stimulus attributes or
experimental context. The basic idea is to supplement conventional electromagnetic forward models of how sources are expressed in measurement space, with a model of how
source activity is generated by neuronal dynamics. A single inversion of this extended forward model enables inference about both the spatial deployment of sources and the
underlying neuronal architecture generating their signals. Left: This schematic shows a few sources that are coupled with extrinsic connections. Each source is modelled with three
subpopulations (pyramidal, spiny-stellate and inhibitory interneurons). These have been assigned to granular and agranular cortical layers, which receive forward and backward
connections respectively. Right: Source model with a layered architecture comprising three neuronal subpopulations, each with three states; voltage V(t)(j) and (excitatory and
Inhibitory) conductances g(t)i(j):i ∈I, E for the jth subpopulation. The neuronal state equations here are much more complicated than for fMRI (see Fig. 3). In this instance, they are
based on a Morris–Lecar (Morris and Lecar, 1981) model and include random ﬂuctuations on the neuronal states, Γ(t)i:i∈ I,E (see Marreiros et al., 2009). The effects of these
ﬂuctuations can be modelled in terms of the dynamics of the ensuing probability distribution over the states of a population; this is known as a mean-ﬁeld model. These models can
be contrasted with neural-mass models that only consider the expected (mean) state of the population. In some instances, random ﬂuctuations can have a marked effect on
population dynamics (see Fig. 5).
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deployed cortical areas (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991). This example
draws from the functional models of the previous section: recall that
current formulations of perceptual inference and learning can be cast
in terms of minimising prediction error (e.g., predictive coding;
Mumford, 1992; Rao and Ballard, 1998; Murray et al., 2002; Lee and
Mumford, 2003) or, more generally, surprise. Surprise is simply the
negative log probability of something. In perception, the surprise is
about sensory data, given a perceptual model of how those data were
caused. Although surprise cannot be measured directly a free-energy
bound on surprise can be evaluated (Friston et al., 2006). Thepredictive coding and free-energy models suggest that prediction
errors are passed forward from lower levels of sensory hierarchies
to higher levels, to optimise representations in the brain's
generative model of the sensorium. Predictions based upon these
representations are then passed down backward connections to
suppress or explain away prediction errors. The message-passing
scheme that emerges rests upon reciprocal or recurrent self-
organised dynamics that necessarily involve forward and backward
connections. There are some key predictions that arise from this
scheme. First, top-down inﬂuences mediated by backward connec-
tions should have a tangible inﬂuence on evoked responses that are
Fig. 5. Population dynamics and nested oscillations. Nested oscillations in the three-subpopulation source model shown in the previous ﬁgure (Fig. 4). The oscillations were elicited
by a slow sinusoidal input for homologous mean-ﬁeld and neural-mass (single source) models. The only difference between these models is that the dispersion or variance of states
within each subpopulation is ignored in neural-mass models. This precludes dynamical interactions between the mean and dispersion of states and can lead to different dynamics.
Exogenous input is shown in light blue, spiny interneuron depolarization in dark blue, inhibitory interneurons in green and pyramidal depolarization in red. The nonlinear
interactions between voltage and conductance produces phase-amplitude coupling in the ensuing dynamics. This is a nonlinear phenomenon that couples different frequencies (see
also Fig. 7). The MFM shows deeper oscillatory responses during the nested oscillations. See Marreiros et al. (2009) for details and further references.
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Second, the excitatory inﬂuences of forward (glutamatergic) con-
nections must be balanced by the (polysynaptic) inhibitory
inﬂuence of backward connections; this completes the feedback
loop suppressing prediction error. Third, the backward connections
should involve nonlinear or modulatory effects; because it is these,
and only these, that model nonlinearities in the world that generate
sensory input.
These functionally grounded attributes of forward and backward
connections and their asymmetries are exactly the sort of issue that
biophysical models are used to test. A fairly comprehensive picture is
now emerging from DCM studies using several modalities and
paradigms: Initial studies focused on attentional modulation in visual
processing. These studies conﬁrmed that the attentional modulation
of visually evoked responses throughout the visual hierarchy could be
accounted for by changes in the strength of connections mediated by
attentional set (see Friston, Harrison and Penny, 2003; Fig. 3). In other
words, no extra input was required to explain attention-related
responses; these were explained sufﬁciently by recurrent dynamics
among reciprocally connected areas whose inﬂuence on each other
increased during attentive states.
More recently the temporal anatomy of forward and backward
inﬂuences has been addressed using DCM for event related potentials
ERPs. Garrido et al. (2007b) used Bayesian model comparison to show
that the evidence for backward connections was more pronounced in
later components of the ERP. Put in another way, backward
connections are necessary to explain late or endogenous response
components in simple auditory ERPs (see Fig. 6). These results ﬁt
comfortably with the dynamics of reciprocally connected neuronal
populations, whose time constants are much greater than any single
neuronal unit within each population. Garrido et al., (2008) thenwenton to ask whether one could understand repetition suppression in
terms of changes in forward and backward connection strengths that
are entailed by predictive coding. DCM showed that repetition
suppression, of the sort that might explain the mismatch negativity
(Näätänen, 2003), could be explained purely in terms of a change in
forward and backward connections with repeated exposure to a
particular stimulus. Furthermore, by using functional forms for the
repetition-dependent changes in coupling strength, Garrido et al.
(2009) showed that changes in extrinsic (cortico-cortical) coupling
were formally distinct from intrinsic (within area) coupling. This was
consistent with theoretical predictions about changes in post-synaptic
gain with surprise and distinct changes in synaptic efﬁcacy associated
with learning under predictive coding. Finally, Chen et al. (2009)
addressed functional asymmetries in forward and backward connec-
tions during face perception, using DCM for induced responses. These
asymmetries were expressed in terms of nonlinear or cross-frequency
coupling; where high frequencies in a lower area excited low
frequencies in a higher area, whereas the reciprocal inﬂuences
where inhibitory (see Fig. 7). These results may be related to the
differential expression of gamma activity in superﬁcial and deep
pyramidal cells that are the origin of forward and backward
connections, respectively (see Chrobak and Buzsaki, 1998; Roopun
et al., 2008; Fries, 2009).
In conclusion, we have come some way, in terms of understanding
the functional anatomy of forward and backward connections in the
brain. Interestingly, some of the more compelling insights have been
obtained by using biophysical models with simple paradigms (like the
mismatch negativity) and simple noninvasive techniques (like EEG).
Despite the simplicity of these empirical techniques, computational
neuroscience equips us with models or ‘mathematical microscopes’
that see beyond the surface structure of data.
Fig. 6. Forward and backward connections (a DCM study of evoked responses). Neuronal responses to stimuli, measured electrophysiologically, unfold over several hundred
milliseconds. Early or exogenous components are thought to reﬂect a perturbation of neuronal dynamics by (bottom-up) sensory inputs. Conversely, later endogenous components
have been ascribed to (top-down) recurrent dynamics among hierarchical cortical levels. This example shows that late components of event-related responses are indeed mediated
by backward connections. The evidence is furnished by dynamic causal modelling of auditory responses, elicited in an oddball paradigm using electroencephalography (EEG). Here,
we consider the evidence for models with and without backward connections in data gathered over increasing windows of peristimulus time; to see whether backward connections
are necessary to explain late components. Left (model speciﬁcation and data): The upper graph shows the ERP responses to a deviant tone, from 0 to 400 ms peristimulus time
(averaged over subjects). Sources comprising the DCMwere connected with backward (grey) and/or forward (dark grey) connections as shown below. A1: primary auditory cortex,
STG: superior temporal gyrus, IFG: inferior temporal gyrus. Two different models were tested, with and without backward connections (FB and F, respectively). Sources (estimated
posterior moments and locations of equivalent dipoles) are superimposed on anMRI of a standard brain inMNI space (upper left). Right (Bayesianmodel selection): The upper graph
shows the differences in log-evidence when comparing the model with backward connections (FB) against the model without (F). It shows that the evidence for the model with
backward connections is substantially greater when, and only when, we consider the evidence in data, late in peristimulus time (after about 220 ms). The lower graphs show
predicted (solid) and observed (broken) responses (of the principal spatial mode in channel space). The improved ﬁt afforded by backward connections (for later components) is
evident. This sort of result links a generic feature of brain responses with recurrent dynamics; which are a cornerstone of most modern theories of perceptual inference and learning.
See Garrido et al. (2007b) for further details.
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In summary, dynamic causal modelling calls on biophysical models
of neuronal dynamics by treating them as generative models for
empirical time series. The ensuing inferences pertain to the models
per se and their parameters (e.g., effective connectivity) that generate
observed responses. Using model comparison, one can search over
wide model spaces to ﬁnd optimal architectures or networks. Having
selected the best model (or subset of models), one then has access to
the posterior density on the neuronal and coupling parameters
deﬁning the network. Of key interest here are changes in coupling that
are induced experimentally with, for example, drugs, attentional set
or time. These experimentally induced changes enable one to
characterise the context-sensitive reconﬁguration of brain networks
and test hypotheses about the relative inﬂuence of top-down andbottom-up signals. We now conclude with a few comments on future
developments in computational neuroimaging.
Discussion
Computational neuroimaging has been reviewed here in terms of
functionally informed computational models of brain function and
biophysically informed computational models of neuronal processes.
We have also made passing reference to dynamical systems theory
when explaining self-organised dynamics that play out on anatomical
brain structures. One might ask, where all this is going? One obvious
answer is the integration of these streams; an integration that
presents interesting and important challenges. First, can we use
computational models of brain function to constrain biophysical
models of observed brain responses? Although there have been
Fig. 7. Forward and backward connections (a DCM study of induced responses). This example provides evidence for functional asymmetries between forward and backward
connections that deﬁne hierarchical architectures in the brain. It exploits the fact that modulatory or nonlinear inﬂuences of one neuronal system on another (i.e., effective
connectivity) entail coupling between different frequencies (see Fig. 5). Functional asymmetry is addressed here by comparing dynamic causal models of MEG responses induced by
visual processing of faces. Bayesian model comparison indicated that the best model had nonlinear forward and backward connections. Under this model, there is a striking
asymmetry between these connections; in which high (gamma) frequencies in higher cortical areas suppressed low (alpha) frequencies in lower areas. This suppression was
signiﬁcantly greater than the homologous coupling in the forward connections. These results highlight the importance of nonlinear coupling among brain regions and point to a
functional asymmetry between forward and backward connections in cortical hierarchies. Left: (Above): Log-evidences (pooled over subjects) for four DCMs with different
combinations of linear and nonlinear (N vs. L) coupling in forward and backward (F vs. B) connections. It can be seen that the best model is FNBN, which entails nonlinear coupling in
both forward and backward connections. (Below): Location of the four sources (in MNI coordinates) and basic connectivity structure of themodels. LV and RV: left and right occipital
face area; LF and RF: left and right fusiform face area. Right: (Above): SPM of the t-statistic (pN0.05 uncorrected) testing for a greater suppressive effect of backward connections,
relative to forward connections (over subjects and hemisphere). (Below): Subject and hemisphere-speciﬁc estimates of the coupling strengths at the maximum of the SPM (red
arrow). See Chen et al. (2009) for further details.
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computational theories of brain function, no one has yet used a
biophysical model of neuronal processing, which is optimising the
same thing as the subject. In other words, current DCMs are
biophysically but not functionally informed. The dénouement of this
modelling initiative may be the use of neuronally plausible optimi-
sation schemes (that perceive, learn and decide) as biophysical DCMs
that are trying to explain observed data. The exciting prospect here is
that one can then disambiguate between neuronal implementations
of the functional models considered above; both in terms of the
physical architectures and time constants of these schemes.
There are several nice examples of mapping from biophysical
models to function, which could be addressed with neuroimaging:
There is already a considerable literature suggesting the decay of short
term memory can be explained by transient population attractor
dynamics (e.g., Wong andWang, 2005) and decision making with the
‘resolution’ of stochastic instability (e.g., Deco and Rolls, 2006). The
construct validity of these associations (between emergent properties
of dynamical systems and neuronal computation) may rest on
empirical evidence for the implicit neuronal dynamics during
computations that are veriﬁed behaviourally; or indeed the loss of
computational capacity in the absence of requisite dynamics. Again,the message here is that computational models provide not only a
hypothesis about how the brain works but predictions about both
neuronal and behavioural responses that can be tested jointly in a
neuroimaging context.
The second challenge is to model pattern formation (Jirsa and
Kelso, 2000; van Albada et al., 2009; Buice and Cowan, 2009) and
autonomous dynamics (Freeman, 1994; Tsuda, 2001; Breakspear and
Stam, 2005; Bressler and Tognoli, 2006; Rabinovich et al., 2008) using
generative models that have the same degree of biological realism as
DCMs for experimentally elicited responses. This may require
extension of the current models to include spatial ﬁelds (e.g., over
the cortical surface) that contain these patterns (e.g., Coombes and
Doole, 1996; Jirsa and Kelso, 2000). Some provisional work has been
done in this direction (Daunizeau et al., 2009), but there are
interesting challenges ahead. For example, we may have to generalise
our notion of a connection to a coupling tensor (a four-dimensional
object) that couples two (two-dimensional) ﬁelds. Implicit in this sort
of modelling will be the ability to infer the unknown and
instantaneous neuronal states that show self-organised behaviour.
This will require a more thorough development of stochastic state-
space models (stochastic DCMs) that allow for unknown ﬂuctuations
in neuronal activity, which may predominate in the absence of any
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to understand endogenous ﬂuctuations and self-organised criticality
(Buice and Cowan, 2009; Kitzbichler et al., 2009). It is obvious that
these challenges can only be met by appealing to computational
neuroscience and dynamical systems theory, while exploiting the
empirical constraints afforded by imaging neuroscience.
We close this review with an example of how computational fMRI
might be used to disambiguate between competing functional models
and resolve an outstanding question in computational neuroscience
(see Fiorillo et al., 2003; Niv et al., 2005).
Precision or prediction error?
Classical reinforcement learning models are based on the solution
to something called the Bellman equation (Bellman, 1952). The
solution to this equation can be very difﬁcult to obtain but can be
approximated using iterative schemes (Sutton and Barto, 1981). These
approximate solutions, which rest on reward prediction error, lead to
temporal difference models and simpler variants in psychology (e.g.,
Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). However, a recent computational
perspective suggests that reinforcement learning can be cast in
terms of perceptual learning (Friston et al., 2009). This involves the
suppression of sensory prediction error or surprise and speaks to a role
of dopamine in encoding the precision or uncertainty about prediction
errors (cf. Fiorillo et al., 2003). Crucially, the precision of prediction
error is unsigned, unlike the signed reward prediction error used in
reinforcement learning. “Neural correlates of such [reward] predic-
tion-error signals have been observed now in midbrain dopaminergic
neurons, striatum, amygdala and even prefrontal cortex, and models
incorporating prediction errors have been invoked to explain complex
phenomena such as the transition from goal-directed to habitual
behavior” (Niv and Schoenbaum, 2008). The key question is; does
dopamine encode signed prediction error or unsigned precision or
both? Questions about the role of dopamine in representing precision
or uncertainty have been debated earnestly in the literature (Niv et al.,
2005; Fiorillo et al., 2005) and are exactly the sort of question that
computational fMRI could, in principle, address (by comparingmodels
based on signed prediction error, unsigned precision, or both). There are
other pressingquestions about the role of dopamine in reportingnovelty
or surprise, in relation to reward prediction errors (reviewed nicely in
Dayan and Niv, 2008). As noted by Niv and Schoenbaum (2008), “The
recognition that computational ideas from reinforcement learning are
relevant to the study of neural circuits has taken the cognitive
neuroscience community by storm…. Yet, like any revolution, the fast-
paced progress has left an uneven understanding in its wake.” This
revolution and its resolution may rest on computational neuroimaging.
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